On Habits and Functions in Everyday Aesthetics by Puolakka, Kalle
Contemporary Aesthetics ( Journal)
Volume 16 (2018)
1-1-2018
On Habits and Functions in Everyday Aesthetics
Kalle Puolakka
Univeristy of Helsinki, kalle.puolakka@helsinki.fi
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.risd.edu/
liberalarts_contempaesthetics
Part of the Esthetics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Liberal Arts Division at DigitalCommons@RISD. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Contemporary Aesthetics ( Journal) by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@RISD. For more information, please contact mpompeli@risd.edu.
About CA
Journal
Contact CA
Links
Submissions
Search Journal
Enter search terms
Search
Editorial Board
Permission to Reprint
Privacy
Site Map
Publisher
Webmaster
On Habits and Functions in Everyday Aesthetics
  Kalle Puolakka 
Abstract
A group of theorists in everyday aesthetics, named restrictivists, have
explicated the notion of the everyday in terms of a particular stance of
everydayness that they believe, in time, comes to characterize people’s
relationships to their daily things and environments. The everyday is
revealed to be something habitual and routine that, despite its
ordinariness, provides a pleasurable sense of safety and trust. In this
paper, I present a series of considerations drawing on John Dewey’s
notion of habit, on the one hand, and Jane Forsey’s account of the
aesthetics of design, on the other, that call into question the general
image of the everyday present in restrictivists’ work. These
examinations, along with a look at the notion of the everyday at the end
of the paper, will show, I believe, that while restrictivism may very well
capture some important aspects of everyday life, the structure and
character some of its main proponents attach to the everyday do not
have the necessity and inevitability they assume.
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1. Introduction: expansionism vs. restrictivism
Thomas Leddy has helpfully framed the current state of everyday
aesthetics as a debate between the expansionists and the restrictivists.
The expansionists understand everyday aesthetics as a field dealing
with heightened experiences that raise the everyday above the ordinary
and the routine. John Dewey’s notion of aesthetic experience, which
refers to a very lively experience with its own unique developmental
character, has served as an important background inspiration for the
expansionist position, but Leddy has also used the concepts of awe and
aura to describe the understanding of aesthetic experience behind this
view.[1] While for the expansionists there is no determinate distinction
between the aesthetics of the everyday and the aesthetics of art,
restrictivists believe that the everyday has its own aesthetic character
having to do with the sense of familiarity they believe, in general, colors
our everyday lives.[2] Although these experiences are not as attention-
grabbing and intensive as the best experiences of art, they nevertheless
should be understood as aesthetic in character.
Some proponents of restrictivism have named the experiential level of
the everyday that lacks the kinds of special qualities that Leddy tries to
capture with notions of awe and aura as “the everydayness of the
everyday.” This emphasis is particularly important for the work of Arto
Haapala and Ossi Naukkarinen. Moreover, they attach a kind of basic
structure to the everyday that, in turn, has consequences on how the
aesthetics of the everyday should be approached. What unites Haapala
and Naukkarinen, in particular, is that they both place considerable
emphasis on the relational character of the everyday. The everyday is
not constituted by a group of objects, events, and activities but rather by
a specific kind of attitude we take toward the objects and events that
surround us daily and the activities we perform regularly. This is how
Naukkarinen explains this relationship:
The everyday attitude is colored with routines, familiarity,
continuity, normalcy, habits, the slow process of
acclimatization, even superficiality and a sort of half-
consciousness and not with creative experiments,
exceptions, constant questioning and change, analyses,
and deep reflections.[3]
Groupings of philosophical positions can, of course, be dangerous in
that they can give some important details of individual philosophers’
work too little consideration, but Leddy’s taxonomy between restrictivism
and expansionism does embrace some genuine points of disagreement
between everyday aestheticians and helps to bring focus to the
conversation. In this paper, I will continue on the path started by Leddy
by taking a critical look at, in particular, the strand of restrictivism
represented by Haapala’s and Naukkarinen’s work, and argue that the
structure their analyses attach to the everyday is less necessary than
they presume. Many of their formulations suggest that the idea of
everydayness is intended to capture the constitutive factors of everyday
experience, something that everyday experience necessarily is like.
Because of the effect of repetition and routinization, most of our waking
lives inevitably becomes characterized by the sorts of qualities Haapala
and Naukkarinen include in the notion of everydayness. The everyday
understood in this sense is “the unavoidable basis on which everything
else is built,” and the further away our experience moves from the
qualities of routine and half-consciousness, the further away we move
from the sphere of the everyday. Instead of ‘everyday,’ ‘break,’ or even
‘rupture’ turn out to be more appropriate epithets for describing our
experience in such cases.[4]
My argument will be founded on a reading of two notions that widely
appear in Haapala’s and Naukkarinen’s line of restrictivism: habit and
function. Drawing on John Dewey’s understanding of habits that
strangely has been little considered in everyday aesthetics, I show that
habits are much richer and more complex things than assumed,
particularly in Naukkarinen’s view on the everydayness of the everyday,
and that the notion of habit bears no necessary relation to unreflective
routines. That our everyday lives are constituted by different habits does
not, by itself, tell that much about the quality of the experiences the
everyday includes. Similarly, the ubiquity of habits in everyday lives does
not, by itself, imply everydayness in Haapala’s and Naukkarinen’s sense.
The second section of the paper is devoted to the concept of function, as
it is approached in Jane Forsey’s meticulous analysis of the aesthetics
of design. As Forsey already points out, her analysis goes against the
understanding of function apparent in Haapala’s work in important
respects.[5] I shall expand on Forsey’s critique, showing the more
fundamental problems that I believe her take on functions implies for the
restrictivist position. Like Dewey, in the case of habits, the role the notion
of function holds in Forsey’s overall account of the aesthetics of design
reveals aspects in this notion that restrictivists have not taken into
proper consideration that, I believe, ultimately show problems in their
understanding of the general character of the everyday.
Despite its somewhat provocative tone at times, the overall aim of this
paper is by no means to call into question the restrictivist position as a
whole; its proponents do provide some important insights into our
possible everyday experiences. Rather, it is to argue that the
philosophical conclusions of restrictivism on the nature of the everyday
are weaker than Haapala and Naukkarinen believe. That is to say,
restrictivist analyses of the everyday might very well capture
characteristics that are typical for the everyday life of many people or,
alternatively, are typical for all at some point, but there is no necessary
reason why most of our waking lives has to have the sort of general
character they assume. It is the leap from typicality to unavoidability the
restrictivists arguably make at many points that I intend to question. The
alternative accounts of the concepts of habit and function provided in the
first two sections of the paper already point in this direction, and this
criticism will be rounded up in the final section by again taking the
concept of the everyday itself under more careful examination. Through
an analysis of three notions that are at the very heart of restrictivism,
habit, function, and the everyday, I want to shake up the images of the
everyday present in the restrictivists’ work, thus encouraging a more
intensive dialog between the two main positions of current everyday
aesthetics.
Some might find the take of this paper overly negative, as substantial
portions of it are devoted to the critiques of others’ views, but in the final
part I also try to make a more positive contribution to the discussion
concerning everyday experience. However, I remain in some ways a
skeptic, for I believe it is very difficult to explicate the nature of people’s
everyday experience from the philosophers or phenomenologists
armchair, as it were, without taking into account the individual features of
people’s habits and characters and how those pair up with their
everyday environments.
2. Habits in the everyday
Restrictivists use the concept of habit to point out the specific kind of
effortlessness that they think characterizes the everyday. By habits, they
mean regularly performed actions or sets of actions that are separated
from other modes of thought and action, such as the deep reflection and
creative experimentation on Naukkarinen’s list, by not requiring direct,
conscious reflection to be carried out. In this sense, the restrictivists
group habits together with such things as routine and custom. Over time,
we come to acquire different sorts of habits for managing everyday
situations. Given their substantial role in the everyday, habits can be
said to constitute its general character. As a cluster of habits underlies
everyday behavior, experientially the everyday becomes marked by
“normalcy, routine, repetition, habituality, and ordinariness,” or even a
sort of coziness, in the best of cases, rather than vividness or
vibrancy.[6]
Dewey’s account, however, shows that habits are much more nuanced
and varied things than restrictivists realize. While habits do indeed
include the unreflective forms of behavior that guarantee the easy flow of
everyday life, according to Dewey, habits, ultimately, encompass a huge
array of different forms of behavior and thinking, in addition to attitudes,
dispositions, and sensitivities. Dewey explains this in his own distinctive
style:
All habits are demands for certain kinds of activity… In
any intelligible sense, they are the will. They form our
effective desires and they furnish us with our working
capacities. They rule our thoughts, determining which
shall appear and be strong and which shall pass from
light into obscurity.[7]
By “doing all the perceiving, recognition, imagining, recalling, judging,
conceiving, and reasoning that is done,” habits determine our ways of
interacting with the world in general and the “interpenetration” of our
habits forms what Dewey calls our “character.”[8] Although some
individual habits and cultural customs can be very deep-rooted, habits
are nevertheless ultimately elastic in nature. Otherwise, no form of
individual development or social progress would be possible.[9] Some
habits are also more malleable than others, and the most enduring ones
form the steadiest parts of our character. In line with his general
philosophy of experience, an aspect of habits that Dewey repeatedly
emphasizes in his investigation is that they take form and develop in
interaction with the environment.
In assimilating habits with some kinds of semi-consciously carried-out
routines, restrictivists miss that not all habits stand on an equal footing or
are of equal value. Dewey explains his reasons for choosing the word
‘habit’ rather than ‘attitude’ or ‘disposition:’ “we need a word to express
that kind of human activity which is influenced by prior activity and in that
sense acquired; which contains within itself a certain ordering of minor
elements of action; which is projective, dynamic in quality….”[10] Dewey
also explicitly states that a habit should not be identified “with routine.”
Even though repetition is the “tendency” of many habits, it is, however,
“in no sense the essence of habit.”[11] We do indeed have habits related
to cooking, cleaning, shopping, and commuting, but there are also
“habits of exploration and imagination.”[12] On the Deweyan account,
imagination can also be seen as a kind of habit or as a collection of
them, as long as it is something very ingrained in a person’s
character.[13] One has an imaginative character when one has the habit
of thinking in imaginative ways.
Similarly, it is possible to make a distinction between different levels of
habits, for some of them are sorts of metahabits. They refer to our
capacity to look at and reflect upon our habits as a whole. While, at least
to the best of my knowledge, the term does not appear in Dewey’s work,
these could be called “deliberative habits” that determine how we
engage with situations that call for reflection and deliberation having to
do with questions concerning the efficacy of our current habits, that is to
say, whether we should refine, change, or develop new habits in light of
new situations and changed circumstances, such as reaching a goal we
have gradually started to find important. To adequately embrace such
situations, it is, in Dewey’s view, important to foster “those habits and
impulses which lead to a broad, just, sympathetic survey of
situations.”[14] Moreover, not all habits emerge as kinds of byproducts of
everyday dealings, but forming habits particularly related to work,
hobbies, and some more complex social situations can involve a great
deal of reflection, practice, and learning, and these sorts of habits can
also be the objects of continuous refinement. Dewey calls habits with this
sort of reflective background “intelligent” or even “artistic,” which come
close to what, ordinarily, is meant by skill.[15]
Naukkarinen believes that, for Dewey, the value of habits primarily lies in
their making “almost automatic behavior” possible, which, in turn, is
thought to lend support for the restrictivist view of the everyday as
something smooth, normal, and routine.[16] Dewey’s attitude towards
habits, however, is, in the end, somewhat value-neutral. Habits
themselves do not carry any value; we have to have them to simply stay
alive or to have any type of social life. The relevant distinction is not
between habits and some other forms of action, such as experimenting,
but between different sorts of habits, particularly between those habits
that stultify thinking and make us unresponsive to new situations and
those that make rich and many-sided reflection and encounters with the
world possible. From a Deweyan perspective, experimenting, too, is
underlain by habits.[17] Forming new habits in response to new
situations, in Dewey’s view, requires such capacities as “increased
susceptibility, sensitiveness, responsiveness,” and such habits that
reinforce these character traits are particularly valuable in Dewey’s eyes.
Habits can, indeed, be seen as kinds of grooves that help us navigate in
our everyday life. Nonetheless, Dewey notes that we can also have “the
power to acquire many and varied grooves,” which, in turn, in his view,
“denotes high sensitivity, explosiveness.”[18]
Even this brief look at Dewey’s conception of habits shows that not all
habits bear a direct relationship to unreflectively carried out routines, as
the restrictivist reading seems to assume. Precisely this assimilation is
the weak spot in the restrictivist account. The upshots of this oversight,
however, go beyond questions concerning how to interpret Dewey, for it
undermines the restrictivists’ general image of the everyday as
something intrinsically routine, easy, and normal.[19] Even though our
everyday lives are constituted by a set of habits, it does not follow that
the general tone of the everyday is necessarily characterized by the
sorts of qualities the restrictivists find essential to it.[20] There are, of
course, many routines that are more or less universally shared by all
people, like morning routines and undressing before going to sleep.
However, in light of Dewey’s analysis, it is wrong to take these sorts of
routines as providing some kind of general model of what an everyday
activity is like and extend it to concern more complex everyday habits. If
habits are far richer and more many-sided things than restrictivists
assume, so can the general character of everyday life be, too. There is
no intrinsic reason why the experiences had in connection with habits
would, in some ways, be low-key and almost imperceptible. It is
perfectly possible for the everyday to be exciting, even electrifying, even
though it is permeated by various habits; this simply depends on the
habits one has. Dewey’s analysis shows that there is no one experiential
quality that underlies all habits. From this perspective, half-
consciousness also turns out to be more a matter of a particular set of
contingent individual habits rather than something that would be in-built
in everyday life, as Naukkarinen believes. The range and content of
one’s habits can have a huge effect on the general quality of one’s
everyday life; experientially, not all habits are of a piece.
The restrictivists could, of course, limit their view to concern those habits
that are characterized by the sort of unreflectiveness that they see as the
essential feature of all habits. However, this would seem to make the
position too limited, as it would rule out many important human habits
and character traits, such as imagination, that can be constitutive of the
quality of the everyday. From a Deweyan perspective, this revised
restrictivist image of the everyday would, actually, be a real travesty
about the possibilities inherent in human life.
3. Functions in the everyday
Function is another notion with which restrictivists have analyzed some
fundamental features of the everyday. In particular, it has been
considered to illuminate the specific kind of relationship of everydayness
that the restrictivists think we gradually form toward the activities,
objects, and environments making up our everyday lives. In this respect,
the notion of function, like habit, goes to the very heart of restrictivism.
Arto Haapala has provided the most extensive restrictivist treatment of
the everyday from the point of view of the notion of function. His analysis
builds on Martin Heidegger’s well-known analysis of tools. The point that
Haapala draws from Heidegger is that our relationship to tools is
characterized by trustworthiness. The efficient tool does not call for
conscious attention from the nailing carpenter but forms a kind of reliable
background for achieving the end the tool was designed to fulfill. In this
sense, the tool disappears in its usefulness. Similarly, many of our
everyday activities, from commuting to writing on the computer to
shopping at our neighborhood grocery store, are carried out with a
similar type of inattentive smoothness that characterizes the work of a
skilled carpenter using his familiar tools. We direct more conscious
attention to a tool only when it no longer functions properly, as we try to
figure out the cause of the malfunction.[21]
Haapala’s understanding of tools is ultimately very broad. All facets of
our everyday lives are essentially characterized by the sort of
functionality that he seeks to capture with Heidegger’s analysis of tools.
Haapala argues that our attitude toward our everyday environment(s) is
highly functional. Homes, offices, cafés, libraries, lunch places,
neighborhood shops, and other everyday places are, in his view, things
that we use to manage our everyday lives. They are, in other words,
“tools for living.”[22] Due to the functional role they have in our everyday
lives, these tools are not something we tend to directly gaze at, as we
do the sights in a strange environment, or even take any special notice
of in the midst of our everyday dealings. Instead, we relate to them in a
mode that Heidegger termed Indifferenz der Alltäglichkeit.[23] Like the
well-functioning hammer, these everyday places also gradually
disappear in their usefulness and become “simple backgrounds” or
“mere bricks in the fabric of the everyday.”[24] Despite no longer calling
for our direct attention, the different tools we use to manage our
everyday nevertheless give everyday life a specific experiential quality.
As in Naukkarinen’s case, the general tone of the everyday becomes
characterized by a kind of comforting reliability and ease. This is how
Haapala characterizes the experience of the everyday:
We take pleasure in being in the surroundings we are
used to, and fulfilling normal routines. The aesthetics of
everydayness is exactly in the “hiding” of the
extraordinary and disturbing, and feeling homey and in
control. One could paradoxically say that the aesthetics of
the familiar is an aesthetics of “the lacking,” the quiet
fascination of the absence of visual, auditory, and any
other kinds of demands from the surroundings.[25]
However, as in the case of habits, a different kind of understanding of
function and of the position of functional objects in our everyday lives is
also possible. Jane Forsey’s aesthetic analysis of design, for example,
includes such an account. Her understanding of design is very broad. It
not only encompasses the different quotidian objects, from scissors to
shoes to bikes to chairs, but immaterial objects, such as web browsers,
are also included in her conception of design.[26]As she correctly points
out, design objects have an increasing presence in our everyday lives,
even forming “the majority of our contemporary environments.”[27] This
makes Forsey’s account highly relevant for everyday aesthetics, as she
herself notes. Moreover, even though Haapala does not use the term
‘design,’ his analysis concerns the same objects as Forsey’s. As Forsey
notes, “the majority of Haapala’s examples are designed objects: our
homes and offices with all of their furnishings, the buildings in our
neighborhoods along with the cars and phone booths and details of our
local streetscapes, the tools we use in our work and daily chores, and
so on.”[28] The fact that design objects are not intended merely to be
looked at but for use in everyday contexts only serves to further the
connection between design and the everyday.
While Haapala’s approach to functional objects centers on explicating
the almost imperceptible sense of everydayness they can produce,
Forsey believes they can provide a more nuanced addition to our
everyday experience. Forsey sees in Kant’s notion of dependent beauty
a very promising framework for understanding the aesthetic character of
design. What she finds particularly valuable in Kant’s concept is that it
shows how the object’s function can be a part of the judgment of its
aesthetic value. According to Forsey’s reading, in Kantian judgments of
dependent beauty, the cognitive component concerning the object’s
function genuinely informs the aesthetic judgment. The beauty of the
design object, in other words, is not independent from its function but
“we appraise the object because of the perfection in the way it fulfills its
purpose.”[29] The beauty of design consists of an interplay between
form and function, and the best cases of this interplay are specimens of
what Forsey terms “design excellence.”[30] Forsey believes that
judgments of design excellence are guided by the idea of perfection, that
is to say, they include an assessment of whether the design object is a
good thing of its kind.[31] Even though an assessment of a design
piece’s aesthetic value includes components that are ruled out from
Kantian pure judgments of taste, such as concepts and the idea of a
specific purpose, Forsey nevertheless believes that good pieces of
design can give us aesthetic pleasure, in the genuine Kantian sense.
First, Forsey finds the conceptual component of design judgments less
determinant than is the case in Kantian cognitive judgments. Judgments
of design excellence do not arise from definite concepts, as cognitive
judgments, like “This is a lamp,” do, but from entertaining a range of
possibilities in the mind of how a particular design object’s purpose can
be realized. Judgments of design excellence thereby involve mental
operations that come close to the free play Kant attaches to the pleasure
behind aesthetic judgments.[32] Second, judgments of design
excellence can be disinterested in the sense Kant requires from
aesthetic judgments. Excellent pieces of design can cause pleasurable
experiences even without us having any desire to own them or without
their satisfying our personal desires.[33] Third, Forsey believes that even
the Kantian idea of purposiveness without a specific purpose can be
fitted into her scheme. Unlike crustaceans and pieces of absolute music,
which are some of Kant’s examples of free beauty, design objects do,
indeed, have a specific purpose. The key is, however, to take a more
universal or rational attitude toward the object’s purposefulness. We can
find a design object valuable not only when it helps us to achieve a
certain end that we wish to pursue but also when it can be praised for its
immediate goodness. That is to say, we can find the thing purposive, as
being a kind of ideal embodiment of the relationship between form and a
particular function, even though the purpose it is intended to fulfill would
in no way intersect with our present concerns.[34]
These points, in Forsey’s view, show that all aspects of design
appreciation, from appreciating its surface design qualities to its use, can
engage a free play of the faculties of imagination and understanding
similar to that which Kant finds essential to the experience of beauty, in
general. Experiences of design excellence can be genuine aesthetic
experiences, not just pleasurable bodily sensations that Kant subsumes
under the category of the agreeable. Though these Kantian
considerations might seem rather far removed from the everyday,
Forsey thinks quite the opposite is the case. By revealing how
“symbiotically related” form and function are in the appreciation of
design, the Kantian idea of dependent beauty precisely shows that,
without integrating design objects “into our everyday lives and activities,”
it is impossible to give a full assessment of their aesthetic value.[35]
This investigation of Forsey’s view shows that she provides a very
different kind of account of the position functional objects occupy in the
everyday than Haapala, and Forsey actually explicitly criticizes him for
not noting some important experiential aspects that the use of functional
objects can involve. According to her, we do not direct attention to these
objects only in the case of malfunction, as Haapala’s central claim
seems to be, but “we also notice things when they work extremely well,
when they perform their functions with an ease and grace that calls for
our appreciation. And this is the kind of aesthetic judgment that is
particular to design.”[36] The sense of fit and purposiveness that
characterizes Kantian experiences of beauty is something we clearly do
notice.
Haapala could, of course, respond that this is indeed the case with
newly acquired design objects. They still have on aura of strangeness to
them and entice our curiosity. However, once these novel things have
gradually established their place in the fabric of our everyday lives,
design objects, however excellent they may be, ultimately become mere
background hum and, rather than free play, our relationship to them
becomes stamped by the Heideggerian Indifferenz der Alltäglichkeit. The
functional tools that we become accustomed to using turn into mere
means to an end, into something that, in Haapala’s words, “is looked
through rather than looked at.”[37]
Even though the daily use of design objects does indeed gradually
weaken the sense of freshness that they had upon acquisition, an
important factor of Forsey’s Kantian analysis of design aesthetics
nevertheless suggests that Haapala overstresses the extent to which
functional objects disappear in their usefulness. This is the fact that,
being the quotidian things they are, our use of design objects has a long
and wide background upon which our assessments of their aesthetic and
other values are based.[38] For example, I have had dozens of coffee
cups in my daily use before the Iittala cup from which I now tend to drink
coffee. The past experiences with other design objects of the same kind
offer a contrast for evaluating the design objects that are currently at the
center of our everyday lives. Judgments of design excellence are, in this
respect, strongly comparative.[39] Rather than fainting away, previous
good and bad experiences with design objects set up the parameters for
our present interactions with design. This background makes our
experiences with the tools of our everyday life more nuanced in
character than Haapala’s analysis realizes. We can, for example,
appreciate the feel of our favorite pen due to the number of bad
experiences we have had with the pens that we have taken from hotel
rooms and conferences. Another aspect worth noting is that we can also
regularly change the design objects that we use for a particular daily
purpose. For example, it is not extraordinary to have more than one pair
of shoes for everyday use. In this case, the comparative class of other
experiences forming the horizon for our present use experience is much
more vivid in our mind than is the case, for example, with the single
coffee cup we use from day to day. This makes design excellence an
even more easily noticeable quality of some everyday objects.
I am prone to think Haapala simply exaggerates the extent to which
functional objects fall below the radar of everyday consciousness as a
result of continuous use. At least, some everyday objects would seem
more resistant to this effect than others, whether it has to do with the
aesthetic qualities accompanying their use, or just their surface aesthetic
qualities or some kind of mixture of these two. It is also good to note that
the reason behind the gradual diminishment of the experience is not
always in the user’s changed attitude but in the object itself. Even
though a Bruno Magli will sustain its perfect feel substantially longer than
a cheap sneaker, it is not an everlasting thing.
A possible rejoinder Haapala could, of course, make is that the
experience Forsey attaches to design excellence requires an
attentiveness that ultimately renders her account of design experience
non-everyday-like. Everydayness is precisely something that does not
capture or call for our attention. By attending to the design excellence of
functional objects, we move from the comforting sphere of the familiar to
the realm of the strange. However, I find this possible response a dead
end, for it presupposes a far too simplistic picture of our everyday
awareness. Not all forms of more direct attentiveness to objects and
environments can be excluded this straightforwardly from everyday
consciousness. We simply are not as blind in our everyday dealings as
this response assumes. It is perfectly possible to appreciate the design
excellence of a pen while writing and the comfort of a shoe while walking.
This does not even require any sort of laborious multitasking or division
of attention. As the appreciation of design objects is tightly incorporated
into everyday activity, the experience of their excellence and beauty can
be very much part of everyday life.
4. Conclusion
It is important to note that the accounts of the everyday given by
Haapala and Naukkarinen are not mere descriptions of everyday life but
have a significantly more ambitious goal. They attempt to reveal the
constitutive structure of an important area of human life, that is, the
everyday, arguing that the attitude of everydayness that Naukkarinen
assimilates with “a kind of half-consciousness” is the inevitable outcome
of everyday habits. In Haapala’s words, everydayness is something “as
unavoidable as death,” the significant difference between them merely
being that the everyday is “present all the time.”[40] It is not just that we
humans tend to wake up in the same place each morning and do the
same things daily. The restrictivists go further than this, arguing that,
overtime, our attitude toward our daily activities and daily environments
necessarily becomes colored by the kind of everydayness that they think
“constitutes the everyday.”[41] Everydayness becomes almost a kind of
blanket that, in time, encloses all aspects of our daily lives as a result of
acclimatization and, in a way, swallows up the sense of
extraordinariness and vitality that some everyday factors might have had
at first. The events, activities, objects, and people our everyday consists
of is, in Naukkarinen’s words, “a completely different matter.”[42]
Everydayness is something that characterizes all possible contents and
configurations of everyday life and, in this respect, is, in the restrictivist
view, the condition of everyday experience.
However, what ultimately is the source of the necessity restrictivists posit
to this attitude of everydayness? Where does it come from? And is
human life truly sliced up in the way the restrictivist position seems to
assume, that it necessarily has this kind of kernel, called “the everyday,”
that is separated from other areas by the unique attitude of
everydayness? There are many factors that play a decisive role in
forming people’s everyday experience that restrictivists have not taken
properly into account, such as individual temperament, personality, and
character. It is hard to deny that these are constitutive to the character of
one’s everyday life, along with how these individual features resonate
with one’s everyday environments and with the communities of which
one is a part. From this perspective, the following questions, for
example, become relevant for investigating people’s everyday
experience. How well is a person able to use the different facets of his or
her personality and skills in the everyday? What sort of interactions does
one’s everyday environments make possible for a person with a certain
personality and character and with a specific set of interests? Do
everyday environments set obstacles for realizing one’s personality or
support it, or even inspire growth?
Against this background, it seems somewhat questionable to posit some
type of everyday attitude above these individual and environmental
considerations that inevitably comes to determine the character of the
everyday, regardless of people’s individual characteristics and how those
relate to their everyday environments. Behind these points it is, of
course, not difficult to detect the Deweyan idea that “all conduct is
interaction between elements of the human nature and the environment,”
where environment is understood in the broadest possible sense as
“those conditions that promote or hinder, stimulate or inhibit, the
characteristic activities of a living being.”[43]
Naukkarinen writes that the everyday “is nothing very exceptional,
strange, weird, or extraordinary.”[44] This might well be true. But why
cannot the everyday be imaginative, be filled with events, books,
colleagues, people, and environments serving as endless sources of
inspiration and hopes and dreams that give the everyday a sense of
direction and rhythm? There is at least no conceptual reason why the
everyday cannot be like this. If someone with a highly imaginative,
creative, intelligent, and perceptive personality can utilize his or her
character traits fully in daily life, why would the character of the everyday
of this type of person be determined by some attitude of everydayness
rather than by individual personality and how it resonates with such a
person’s everyday environments? And how about people with highly rich
inner lives, or people open to new experiences who embrace novel
situations effortlessly? Put conversely, if the character of a person with
these sorts of imaginative traits would gradually degrade to the state of
half-consciousness, as Naukkarinen describes the everyday attitude,
wouldn’t we say that everything is not right in that person’s everyday
life?
In the end, describing the everyday with terms such as imaginative,
inspired, or vigorous seems to become nearly a conceptual impossibility,
under the restrictivists’ understanding of the everyday. They picture the
everyday almost as a kind of closed space, where everything novel and
fresh is perceived as something lying outside of its circles.[45] They
conceptualize the everyday in highly binary opposites, such as
routine/non-routine, familiar/strange, ordinary/extraordinary,
normalness/exceptionality, harmony/rupture. Nonetheless, another type
of image of the everyday is also possible. Rather than a circle, the
everyday might be better described as a continuum that, like life itself, at
different points, includes different degrees and shades of familiarity and
strangeness. The efforts required from a researcher in setting up a new
project is a good example of this type of mode of being. This process,
that can sometimes take months, if not years, involves a very complex
mixture of something old and new and, in the best of cases, engages all
facets of a researcher’s personality and creativity.
But why could the everyday in general not be characterized by such a
mixture of old and new, in addition to imaginative engagement? That is
to say, why could the routine and the non-routine, the familiar and the
strange, the extraordinary and the ordinary not coexist in human
experience at almost every moment, and sometimes interact with and
even reinforce each other to generate improved everyday experience?
As Thomas Alexander writes on the position of imagination in everyday
life: “imagination, the human effort to organize experience and mediate
the transition from past to future, from old to new, is an integral part of
our ordinary life, though it is capable of great refinement and conscious
development….”[46] In a more recent article, Naukkarinen already
moves toward the sort of image I am sketching here in his thinking about
the everyday, claiming that the everydayness of the everyday ultimately
is something that comes in degrees.[47]
All this is to say is that the everyday does not necessarily have to be
conceptually connected to the sorts of things that the restrictivists try to
capture with the notion of everydayness. I am not claiming that their
account of the everyday could not overlap with the general qualities of
the everyday of a great number of people. Instead, what I deny is the
restrictivists’ conceptual or constitutive point. Our daily lives do not have
any kind of necessary structure or character that would encompass all
possible forms of interactions between humans and their everyday
environments. To say, as Haapala seems to, that a proper
phenomenological analysis reveals the everyday of all people to be
ultimately pretty much alike on some fundamental level, behind the
possible appearance of glamor and fascination, arguably cuts quite a few
corners.[48] My life is very different from the life of the dynamo Mariinsky
maestro Valery Gergiev, and so is my everyday.
How people relate to the surrounding world is much more heavily
determined by their personality and other mental conditions than some
attitude of everydayness that the restrictivists impose on our everyday
lives.[49] I see no reason why the kind of half-consciousness
Naukkarinen explicates with the notions of routine, familiarity, and
normalcy would be some necessary, overriding attitude of the waking
lives of all people. Already Dewey’s and Forsey’s accounts of habits and
functions have suggested these types of problems in restrictivist
descriptions of the everyday, and it is this point that I have wanted to
press further in conclusion.
There is no reason why the general experiential quality of our everyday
lives could not be considerably more nuanced than Haapala’s and
Naukkarinen’s views on the everydayness of the everyday arguably
leave room for. Haapala actually explicitly states that his Heideggerian
analysis is interested in “the gray colors of the everyday.”[50] However,
the view emerging from the parts of Dewey’s and Forsey’s work
considered above shows that the colors of the everyday can be much
more varied and vivid. Another upshot of the discussion is that people’s
everyday experience can ultimately be dependent on highly individual
factors and be a result of a complex fusion between their habits and
everyday environments that cannot be captured by general conceptual
or phenomenological analyses, even when they are done as carefully as
Haapala’s and Naukkarinen’s. In light of this article, it might be good to
reformulate Naukkarinen’s claim that “the everyday is the unavoidable
basis on which everything else is built” to the form that our habits and
character, and how those pair up with our everyday environments in the
broad Deweyan sense, are the unavoidable basis on which our
everyday is built.[51]
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